Abstract. This paper introduces three new types of combinatorial designs, which we call external difference families (EDF), external BIBDs (EBIBD) and splitting BIBDs. An EDF is a special type of EBIBD, so existence of an EDF implies existence of an EBIBD.
Introduction
Combinatorial designs have played an important role in cryptology. In this paper, we introduce three types of new combinatorial designs, external difference families (EDF), external BIBDs (EBIBD) and splitting BIBDs and show their applications to splitting authentication codes and secret sharing schemes secure against cheaters.
An EDF can be considered as an extension of difference sets and difference families. An EBIBD is a generalization of a balanced incomplete block design (BIBD). These concepts are defined in the next section, where we prove that an EDF is equivalent to an EBIBD having a particular automorphism group. In the remainder of the paper, we discuss applications of these designs to authentication codes and robust secret sharing schemes.
An authentication code (A-code) is called splitting if a message is not uniquely determined by the plaintext (source state) and the key. This concept is very important in the context of authentication codes with arbitration (see [11, 12, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9] ). For splitting A-codes, lower bounds on cheating probabilities [5, 1] and a lower bound on the size of keys [13, 2] are known. However, no schemes were known which meet both these bounds. We show that splitting A-codes with perfect secrecy which meet both of these bounds can be obtained by using EDF.
In a (k, n) secret sharing scheme, a secret s is distributed to n participants, P 1 , . . . , P n . A piece of information given to P i is called a share and is denoted by v i . Tompa and Woll [14] considered the following scenario. Suppose that k − 1 participants P 1 , . . . , P k−1 want to cheat the kth participant P k by opening forged shares v Recently, a lower bound on the size of shares for this problem was derived in [10] . There it was shown that |V i | ≥ (|S| − 1)/δ + 1, where V i denotes the set Table 1 0 1 3 0 -1 3 1 6 -2 3 4 5 - Table 2 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 -1 1 6 -0 -2 2 5 -0 -3 3 4 - Table 3 0 1 2 4 0 2 4 1 1 3 2 7 8 4 5 6 of possible shares for participant P i , S denotes the set of possible secrets, and δ denotes the cheating probability.
This bound can be met with equality if δ ≥ 1/|S|. However, if δ < 1/|S|, then the bound cannot be met. Here we present a new lower bound on |V i | in the case where δ < 1/|S|. We show that
Then we show that secret sharing schemes which meet the new bound can be obtained by using EDF. Further, we prove a weak converse, namely that if there exists a secret sharing scheme which meets our bound, then there exists an EBIBD. Finally, we derive a Fisher-type inequality for splitting BIBDs. We also prove a weak equivalence between splitting BIBDs and splitting A-codes. Further, it is shown that an EDF implies a splitting BIBD.
New Combinatorial Designs
In this section, we introduce two new types of combinatorial designs, external difference families (EDF) and external BIBDs (EBIBD), and we show that an EDF is equivalent to an EBIBD with a particular automorphism.
External Difference Family (EDF)
First, we give definitions of difference sets and difference families. Example 2.1 D = {0, 1, 3} is a (7, 3, 1)-difference set in the group (Z 7 , +). Indeed, the differences modulo 7 are
This is also shown in Table 1 , where the (i, j) entry is d i − d j mod 7. Each element in Z 7 \ {0} appears exactly once in Table 1 .
Definition 2.2 [3] Let (X, +) be an Abelian group of order v. A (v, c, λ)-difference family over X is a collection of u subsets of X, {D 1 , . . . , D u }, such that |D 1 | = · · · = |D u | = c and the multiset union
Example 2.2 D 1 = {0, 1}, D 2 = {0, 2} and D 3 = {0, 3} form a (7, 2, 1)-difference family over Z 7 , where u = 3. This is shown in Table 2 , where each element in Z 7 \ {0} appears exactly once in the diagonal submatrices. Now we define a new combinatorial design that we call an external difference family (EDF). Definition 2.3 Let (X, +) be an Abelian group of order v. A (v, c, λ) u-EDF (or, external difference family) over X is a collection of u subsets of X, denoted
Example 2.3 D 1 = {0, 1} and D 2 = {2, 4} form a (9, 2, 1) 2-EDF over Z 9 . This is shown in Table 3 , where each element in Z 9 \ {0} appears exactly once in the off-diagonal submatrices.
We now state a couple of fundamental properties of EDF. First, it is easy to see that if there exists a (v, c, λ) u-EDF, then
where k = cu.
Proof. It is clear that N 0 = 0. For a = 0, from the definition, we have
External BIBD
The definition of a balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) is given as follows. Now we define our second new combinatorial design, an external BIBD.
Definition 2.5 A (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD (or, external BIBD) is a pair (X, B) such that l = cu for some integer u ≥ 2, and the following properties are satisfied:
2. Every B ∈ B is expressed as a disjoint union B = B 1 ∪ · · · ∪ B u , where
3. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ u, we have that the multiset union
4. For every A, B ∈ B, A = B, we have that
It can be shown that the parameters of an EBIBD are not independent; in fact, λ(v − 1) = l(l − c) as shown below.
Lemma 2.2
Each element x appears in l blocks.
Proof.
Suppose that x appears in r blocks. Count in two ways the number of pairs (B, x) such that x ∈ B, where B is a block. Then we have vl = vr because |X| = |B| = v and |B| = l. Therefore, r = l.
Proof. Fix a block A arbitrarily. We count in two ways the number N of pairs (B, x), where B = A is a block and x is an element such that x ∈ A i and x ∈ B j for some i = j.
First there are v − 1 blocks B other than A. For each B = A, the number of such x is λ from property 4. Therefore, N = λ(v − 1).
Next fix x ∈ A arbitrarily and suppose that x ∈ A i . From Lemma 2.2, x appears in l blocks. Further from property 3, we can see that the number of blocks B such that x ∈ B j with some j = i is l − c. Therefore, N = l(l − c).
Hence λ(v − 1) = l(l − c).
Corollary 2.4
In a (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD, there cannot exist two blocks A and B such that
Then λ = 0, and Theorem 2.3 implies that l = c, or equivalently, u = 1. This contradicts the condition that u ≥ 2.
The Relation between EDF and EBIBD
In this subsection, we show that a (v, c, λ) u-EDF is equivalent to a (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD with a particular automorphism. Suppose (X, B) is a (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD. Let Sym(X) denote the symmetric group of all v! permutations of the elements of X. A permutation γ ∈ Sym(X) is an automorphism of (X, B) provided that there is a permutation of B, say ρ,
for all B ∈ B and for 1 ≤ i ≤ u. In other words, γ maps blocks to blocks in a way that respects the partitions B = B 1 ∪ · · · ∪ B u . The set of all automorphisms of (X, B), denoted Aut(X, B), is a subgroup of Sym(X) that is called the automorphism group of (X, B). A subgroup Γ of Sym(X) is sharply transitive if, for every x ∈ X and for every x ′ ∈ X, there exists a unique γ ∈ Γ such that γ(x) = x ′ . Any additive abelian group, say (X, +), has a natural representation as a sharply transitive subgroup of Sym(X). To be precise, each group element g ∈ X corresponds to a permutation γ g of X defined as follows:
Suppose that (X, +) is an abelian group and Γ is its representation as a sharply transitive subgroup of Sym(X). Further, suppose that (X, B) is a (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD such that Γ is a subgroup of Aut(X, B). Then we say that (X, B) has (X, +) as a sharply transitive automorphism group.
After proving a preliminary lemma, we will state and prove the main theorem of this section.
Lemma 2.5 Suppose T 1 , T 2 ⊆ X, where (X, +) is an additive Abelian group. Let a ∈ X. Then
Theorem 2.6 Let (X, +) be an additive Abelian group of order v. A (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD having (X, +) as a sharply transitive automorphism group, say (X, B), is equivalent to a (v, c, λ) u-EDF over X such that l = cu.
B g i and then define the collection of blocks B to consist of the v blocks B g , g ∈ X. At this point, we do not know if these blocks are all distinct. We will prove that (X, B) is a (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD having (X, +) as a sharply transitive automorphism group (which shows that the blocks are, in fact, distinct).
Property 2 is satisfied since
Property 3 is also obvious since B g i = D i + g for all i and g. Let's consider property 4. Let g, h ∈ X, g = h. We want to compute
where the last equation is obtained by applying Lemma 2.5 with
contains the element h − g exactly λ times. Hence, we have proved property 4. By property 4, there should be no two blocks A and B such that A i = B i for 1 ≤ i ≤ u. This implies property 1. Finally, it is obvious that (X, B) has (X, +) as a sharply transitive automorphism group by the way that (X, B) was constructed.
Let's look now at the converse. Suppose that (X, B) is a (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD having (X, +) as a sharply transitive automorphism group. Pick any A ∈ B, and define
Property 1 is obvious, so let's look at property 2. Let g ∈ X, g = 0, and denote by α g the number of occurrences of g in ∪ i =j (D i − D j ). (We want to show that α g = λ.) Clearly, we have
where we apply Lemma 2.5 with T 1 = A i , T 2 = A j and a = g. Now, since (X, +) is a sharply transitive automorphism group of (X, B) we
Application to Splitting A-codes
In this section, we show that an optimal splitting A-code can be obtained from a (v, c, λ) u-EDF.
Splitting A-code
In the model of authentication codes (A-codes), the transmitter T and the receiver R share a common encoding rule (or key) e. The key e is chosen according to some specified probability distribution. Given a source state (plaintext) s, T computes a message m = e(s) and sends m to R. R accepts or rejects m based on e.
It is possible that more than one message can be used to communicate a particular source state s; this is called splitting. In this case, a message m is computed as m = e(s, r), where r is a random number chosen from some specified finite set. If we define e(s) △ = {m : e(s, r) = m for some r}, then splitting means that |e(s)| > 1. Note also that e(s) ∩ e(ŝ) = ∅ if s =ŝ, for otherwise decoding would be impossible.
Let
We say that e accepts m if m ∈ κ(e).
In an impersonation attack, the opponent O sends a message m to the receiver; O succeeds if m ∈ κ(e) . The impersonation attack probability P I is defined as
where the probability is computed over the set of keys E. In a substitution attack, the opponent O observes a message m transmitted by T , and then substitutes m with another messagem. O succeeds if m ∈ e(s) andm ∈ e(ŝ), where s =ŝ. In other words, the receiver acceptsm as authentic and is misled as to the state of the source. The substitution attack probability P S is defined as follows.
where the probability is computed over the set of keys E. Here are some known bounds on attack probabilities and the number of keys in a (splitting) A-code.
(The bound on P S in [5] was corrected as stated above in [1] .)
Finally, we say that an A-code has perfect secrecy if the opponent O has no information about the source state s given a message m. Formally,
for all s ∈ S and m ∈ M .
Optimum Splitting A-codes Constructed from EDF
In this subsection, we show that an optimal splitting A-code can be obtained from a (v, c, λ) u-EDF. Proof. Consider a splitting A-code such that E = M = X, S = {1, . . . , u} and
for all e ∈ X and all i ∈ S. Then we have:
|e(i)| = |D i | = c, and
Suppose that E and S are uniformly distributed. It is clear that this A-code has perfect secrecy because m = e + x and e is uniformly distributed over X. Let's compute P I .
Since |M | = v, we have equality in Proposition 3.1. Next, we compute P S . Let m,m ∈ M , m =m. First, we observe that Hence we have equality in Proposition 3.2. Finally, we compute
so we have equality in Proposition 3.3.
Application to Secret Sharing Schemes

Definition of Security against Cheaters
In a (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, let S be the set of secrets. In the destribution phase, a dealer outputs a vector (v 1 , . . . , v n ) on input s ∈ S, where v i is called a share of participant P i . In the reconstruction phase, the following conditions must hold.
1. any k or more shares determine the secret s, and 2. no set of k − 1 or fewer shares have any information on the secret s.
Let S denote a random variable distributed over a finite set S. Let V i denote the random variable induced by v i and let
Note that we will usually omit the subscript (i 1 , . . . , i k ) for readability.
as their shares, where v ij denotes the share of P ij . We say that P i k is cheated by the list of forged shares
Definition 4.3
We define the cheating probability as follows:
We say that a (k, n) threshold scheme is δ-secure if
for any {i 1 , . . . , i k−1 } ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
A New Bound on |V i |
Recently, the following lower bound on |V i | was shown.
Proposition 4.1 [10] In a δ-secure (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme,
In this subsection, we derive a more tight lower bound on |V i | for δ < 1/|S|. Theorem 4.2 Suppose that S is uniformly distributed in a δ-secure (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. Then
Proof. Assume that cheaters P i1 , . . . ,
First, we prove that
for any {i 1 , . . . , i k−1 } ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, ∀b = V i1 × · · · × V i k−1 and ∀s ∈ S. Consider a cheaters' strategy as follows. The cheaters chooseŝ ∈ S arbitrarily and then
Finally, they open b ′ such that Sec(b ′ ,x) ∈ {ŝ, ⊥} arbitrarily. P i k is cheated if he hasx and S =ŝ. Therefore,
Since we consider a δ-secure scheme,
Then we obtain eq.(7). Next consider a cheaters' strategy as follows. 
|V i1 | − 1 Figure 1 :
Since the probability is taken over v ′ i1 and x, we have figure 1 , we see that
Therefore, by subsituting eq. (9) into eq. (8), we obtain that
Finally, we prove eq.(6). In a δ-secure scheme, for any cheaters' strategy,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the cheaters as well as v i k . Hence, from eq. (7) and (10),
Therefore, we obtain eq. (6).
Observe that the right hand side of eq. (6) is bigger than that of eq.(5) if δ < 1/|S|. In the next subsection, we show that the bound of Theorem 4.2 can be met with equality.
Remark: We can not remove the condition that S is uniformly distributed from Theorem 4.2 because there exists a counterexample. Consider a (2, 2) threshold secret sharing scheme such as follows.
Let S = {0, 1} and suppose that Pr(S = 0) = 1/4, Pr(S = 1) = 3/4. Let
In what follows, all operations are done over GF (7) . First, the dealer D chooses v 1 ∈ V 1 uniformly. Next, if s = 0 then let v 2 = −v 1 . Otherwise, choose a ∈ {1, 2, 3} uniformly at random and let v 2 = a − v 1 . The secret is reconstructed as
We will show that this scheme is 1/4-secure. On the other hand, the right hand side of eq. (6) 
which is larger than |V 1 | = 7. First in this scheme,
for any v 1 ∈ V 1 because V 1 is uniformly distributed. Similarly, we have
for all v 1 ∈ V 1 .
Next suppose that a malicous P 1 opens v
, then the secret is s = 0. In this case, however,
Therefore, P 2 reconstrcuts s ′ = 1. Hence P 2 is cheated. We can further see that if P 2 has v 2 = 1 − v 1 or 2 − v 1 or 3 − v 1 , then P 2 is not cheated. Therefore, Pr(P 2 is cheated by
Similarly, we can show that Pr(P 2 is cheated by v
. Therefore, this scheme is 1/4-secure.
Optimal Secret Sharing Scheme Constructed from EDF
In this subsection, we show that an optimal secret sharing scheme secure against cheaters can be obtained by using a (v, c, 1) u-EDF.
Theorem 4.3
Suppose that there exists a (v, c, 1) u-EDF such that v is a prime power. Then there exists a δ-secure (k, n) threshold scheme which meets the bound of Theorem 4.2 such that |S| = u and δ = 1/(cu) for any k ≤ n < v.
Proof. Let (D 1 , . . . , D u ) be a (v, c, 1) u-EDF. Consider the following secret sharing scheme. The set of secrets is S = {1, . . . , u}. S is uniformly distributed over S. In what follows, all operations are done over GF (v).
In the distribution phase, for a secret s ∈ S, the dealer chooses d ∈ D s randomly. Then, he chooses a random polynomial f (x) of degree k − 1 such that f (0) = d. The share of P i is v i = f (i). In the reconstruction phase, k or more participants compute the constant term d of f (x) by using the Lagrange interpolation formula. They accept s as the secret iff d ∈ D s for some D s .
We show that the above scheme satisfies our requirements. Without loss of generality, suppose that P 1 , . . . , P k−1 have shares b = (v 1 , . . . , v k−1 ) and P k has share v k . Fix a list of forged shares
. From the Lagrange formula, we have
where
for some i}, and
Thus T is the set of possible values of v k (given b), andṼ k (b → b ′ ) represents the possible values of v k that will lead to P k being cheated.
Note that there is a bijection between T and i D i for a fixed b since β k = 0. Also, v k is uniformly distributed over T because d is uniformly distributed over i D i . Therefore, we have
Now, we have
and
from Theorem 2.1 since λ = 1. Hence,
Finally, from eq.(1) since |S| = u for ∀j, we have
EBIBD from Secret Sharing Schemes
In this subsection, we prove a weak converse of Theorem 4.3. Recall that a (v, c, λ) u-EDF is equivalent to a (v, l, λ) c-EBIBD with a particular automorphism from Theorem 2.6.
Theorem 4.4 For a uniformly distributed S, suppose that there exists a δ-secure (k, n) threshold scheme which meets the bound of Theorem 4.2 for all i. That is, for all i,
Also, suppose that c 
Proof.
Note that |V j | = v for any j. Let S = {1, 2, . . . , |S|} and V △ = {1, 2, . . . , v} = V j for any j. Fix v 2 , . . . , v k−1 arbitrarily. For each i ∈ V, define
We will show that (V, {B i }) is the desired EBIBD. Property 1 is obvious. To prove property 2, first we show that
If the equality of eq. (6) is satisfied, then the equality of eq. (7) must be satisfied from the proof of Theorem 4.2. Therefore,
This means eq.(15) because
Further, since k participants can determine the secret uniquely, it must be that B i,s ∩ B i,ŝ = φ if s =ŝ. Hence, property 2 is satisfied for u = |S| because B i = s∈S B i,s .
Let's now consider property 3. Definê
We can prove that
in the same way as eq. (15). Then for all s ∈ S, it follows that the multiset union i∈V B i,s = cV because v k = i appears in |B i,s | = c blocks for any i ∈ V. Hence, property 3 is satisfied. Finally, let's consider property 4. Recall that B 1,s = {v k : P k computes s when P 1 opens 1}, B h,ŝ = {v k : P k computesŝ when P 1 opens h}, B 1 = ∪ s∈S B 1,s , and |B 1 | = c|S| (from eq. (15)).
Without loss of generality, suppose that P 1 has v 1 = 1 as his original share. Then we have Pr(P k is cheated when P 1 opens h)
Define a binary (v − 1) × c|S| matrix G = (g h,j ) as follows:
,ŝ for some s =ŝ 0 otherwise.
Let H denote the Hamming weight. Let w j be the j-th column of G. Suppose that j ∈ B 1,s . Then from eq.(17), we have
Next, let u h be the h-th row of G. Then
Further, it is easy to see that
Therefore,
Then from eq. (18), we obtain that
On the other hand, from eq. (14), we see that
since c = 1/(δ|S|). Hence it must be that
for any h. (The last equality comes from Eq. (19).) Therefore, property 4 is satisfied.
Splitting BIBD and Fisher-type Inequality
In this section, we introduce a notion of splitting BIBDs and derive a Fisher-type inequality. Then we show a weak equivalence with splitting A-codes. Finally, it is shown that an EDF implies a splitting BIBD. 
Definition
Every
3. For each x, y ∈ V (x = y), there exist exactly λ blocks
Example 5.1 We show a (9, 9, 4 = 2 × 2, 1)-splitting BIBD.
For example, for x = 1 and y = 2 or 4, B 9 satisfies property 3.
Fisher-type Inequality
We first prove the following lemma.
blocks. Further,
Proof. First for any x ∈ V , count in two ways the number of pairs (y, B i ), where y ∈ V and B i is a block such that x ∈ B i,j and y ∈ B i,k with j = k. Then λ(v − 1) = r(l − c).
Next count in two ways the number of pairs ((x, y), B i ), where x = y and B i is a block such that x ∈ B i,j and y ∈ B i,k with j = k. Then
The right hand sides of eq.(20) and eq.(21) must be integers if a splitting BIBD exists. We next show a Fisher-type inequality for splitting BIBDs, which is also a necessary condition for the existence of splitting BIBDs. DefineṼ to be the v-dimensional real vector space having basis {x 1 , . . . , x v }. For each B i,j , define a vector
LetṼ ′ be the subspace ofṼ spanned by the vectors B ij ,
It is clear thatṼ ′ ⊆Ṽ . We will show thatṼ ⊆Ṽ ′ . Let
On the other hand, from Eq. (22) and the definition of splitting BIBD, we have
Therefore, x ∈Ṽ ′ for all x ∈ V . HenceṼ =Ṽ ′ . Then bu ≥ v because dimṼ = v and dimṼ ′ is at most bu. This means that b ≥ v/u. Let's consider property 3. For any x = y, we can see that |{B i : x ∈ B i,j , y ∈ B i,k , j = k}| = |{B i : x − i ∈ D j , y − i ∈ D k , j = k}| = λ because x − y occurs exactly λ times in ∪ j =k (D j − D k ). Hence we have proved property 3.
Weak Equivalence with Splitting A-codes
